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SMALL FISH-BIG ISSUES: THE EFFECT OF TRADE POLICY ON THE GLOBAL SHRIMP MARKET
The shrimp anti-dumping case in the United States brings to the forefront the extent to which the world economy is global. It also highlights the different roles and interests of developed and developing countries. In 1997, the European Union retracted the preferential trade status of Thailand, the world's premier shrimp exporter. In 2001, antibiotics were found in shrimp residue. The European Union declared a zero-tolerance policy that restricted exports especially from Vietnam and China and imposed 100 percent testing on shrimp from Thailand. Both events directly affected exporters' allocation decisions, away from Europe toward the United States. I use these events to trace out the demand for shrimp in the United States versus Europe and to assess the impact of Europe's tariff and non-tariff policies on the price of shrimp in the United States versus Europe. I show how the price response was primarily due to these exogenous changes overseas. This finding reinforces the perception that the U.S. shrimp anti-dumping case against six shrimp exporters that are also developing countries is a modern form of protection to improve the competitive position of U.S. shrimpers. 1 In addition, my findings make a broader, more positive point. I use the events in the shrimp market as a natural experiment to investigate a key proposition in international economics for which very little empirical evidence exists so far: Large countries can affect international prices through their trade policies. Finally, I show the non-negligible trade-diverting effects of international differences in food-safety standards, issues that will only become more important as talks about liberalizing agriculture proceed.
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In the fall of 2002 the Southern Shrimp Alliance, a coalition of shrimp fishers, was formed to fight "unfair" competition from developing countries. The Alliance called for punitive tariffs against Thailand, Vietnam, India, Brazil, Ecuador, and China. It charged U.S. shrimpers were driven out of 1 Blonigen and Prusa (2003) state that anti-dumping cases have long been viewed as protectionism tools.
2 Maskus and Wilson (2001) and Baldwin (2000) analyze technical regulations as instruments of commercial policy in a unilateral, regional, and global trade context. 3 For more information on the U.S. shrimp industry: www.fao.org; www.shrimpnews.com; www.enaca.org (Shrimp Media Monitor); www.seafood.com; and www.globefish.org. Haby, et. al (2002) is a terrific survey of the industry.
business by artificially low prices. Subsequently, the International Trade Commission ruled that the exporters injured the industry and the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed high tariffs for Vietnam and China, and markedly lower ones for the others countries.
The shrimp anti-dumping case emerged in an international shrimp market that had changed dramatically over the years. Increasingly, the global shrimp trade had become a one-way flow from developing-country producers to consumers in Europe, the United States, and Japan. To a large extent, aquaculture was responsible for the surge of shrimp production in developing countries. The shrimp that developed countries imported increasingly had been raised on farms in Asia and Latin America where waterfront property and labor was cheaper and environmental laws less stringent. This surge of imports in itself already posed a challenge for U.S. shrimpers who saw their U.S. market share slip from 43 percent in 1980 to 12 percent in 2001 (Haby, et. al 2002 . Two events overseas increased this challenge even more and laid the groundwork for the anti-dumping case.
The size of the shrimp harvest or catch depends largely on meteorological and environmental parameters, which is why studies with high-frequency data typically take the local supply of shrimp as a
given. 4 In an international context, therefore, the main issue for exporters is to allocate a given shrimp catch across markets in a profit maximizing way. In 1997, Thailand, the largest exporter of shrimp lost its preferential trade status in the European Union. By 1999, it faced a much higher most favored nation (MFN) tariff, while its main competitors retained preferential status. Consequently, Thai shrimp-exporters shifted exports away from Europe toward the United States. In addition, in the fall of 2001 the European Union discovered antibiotics in shrimp residue. The European Union proclaimed a zero-tolerance policy for antibiotics. It restricted imports from especially Vietnam and China and subjected Thai shipments of shrimp to 100 percent antibiotic testing. This induced a massive shift by Chinese, Thai, and Vietnamese exporters away from European to U.S. markets with less stringent standards. The tariff change and the antibiotics crisis are the instruments that I will use to estimate demand for shrimp, since they, for a given demand in terms of consumer prices, shift the supply curve. I find that both events lead to a drop in the relative shrimp price between the United States and Europe for the affected countries.
My analysis shows that the shift in exports and the lower relative price in the United States versus
Europe are a rational response to an exogenous change in the international environment: the change in preferential tariffs and the antibiotics crisis. This finding reinforces the perception of the shrimp antidumping case as a protectionist endeavor that was brought with the promise of not only higher prices but also of a government payout. Indeed, with the Byrd Amendment in place, the Alliance that successfully convinced the government of its case stood to directly receive the collected tariff revenue in what was 4 A much cited reference is Barten and Bettendorf (1989) .
once a very open market attuned to the United States' strong demand for foreign shrimp-80 percent of U.S. consumption stems from abroad.
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I use the specific events in the shrimp market to study a broader issue that is difficult to analyze at a more aggregate level without getting caught in endogeneity problems: the impact of tariff and non-tariff policies on international prices. It is well known that a country's terms of trade matter for its welfare.
Since it is a prominent result that a large country's tariff policy can affect international prices and thus its own and others' terms of trade, one would expect a wealth of empirical studies to relate trade policy to international prices. 6 However, the existing empirical literature on that subject, except for CGE models, is limited. The small-country assumption that takes prices as given is mostly maintained. The ability of countries to affect terms of trade is at the core of the theoretical analyses of preferential trading agreements and the GATT by Bagwell and Staiger (1998, 1999) . Mclaren (2000) emphasizes the potential impact of standards on international prices. Mundell (1964) studies the terms of trade in the context of a preferential trade agreement. Corden (1997) extensively discusses the "optimal tariff argument" for large countries and provides many references. 7 My analysis relates to the trade diversion literature on the impact of non-MFN tariffs on trade volumes, and to Bown and Crowley (2007) who look at third-country tariffs effects on bilateral trade. 8 Kreinin (1961) is a descriptive study of the effect of tariff changes on import prices and volumes. 9 For Goldberg and Knetter (1997) , product markets are segmented if the buyer and seller location affect the terms of the transaction by more than the marginal cost of moving goods from one location to the other. 10 The "pass-through" literature studies how exchange rate shocks affect prices of imported goods abroad. See Knetter and Goldberg (1997) for an excellent survey.
amount of output-the shrimp harvest/catch. This creates an explicit link between the localized market in the United States and in Europe. What the exporter sends to one market will not go to another. In this way, relocating exports from one country to another can change the relative prices in both markets and new policies in one market will affect the other.
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I study shrimp exports for five of the countries subject to the anti-dumping case (Thailand, Vietnam, China, India, and Ecuador) plus Indonesia. These exporters had a significant and continuous presence in both the United States and European Union market between 1996 and 2004 and monthly data are available for that period. 12 The six countries accounted for about 70 percent of shrimp exports to the United States. Before discussing the stylized facts, model, data and specification, I first sketch the context of the shrimp market.
I. The Shrimp Market
Estimates by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] in Figure 1 illustrate the worldwide expansion of shrimp production. Production increased from 0.31 million to 3.8 million metric tons between 1950 and 2002. A marked shift materialized in this period with a growing dichotomy between shrimp-consuming developed countries and shrimp-producing developing countries. As Figure 2 shows, the share of shrimp production by developing countries increased consistently and that of the main consumers-Japan, the United States and Europe-steadily decreased. According to Haby, et. al (2002) , Japan, Europe, and the United States currently consumed some 60 percent of world production.
International trade data tell a similar story. The FAO estimates that consumption at 0.3 million metric tons of exports in 1976 and 1.7 million tons in 2002. The European Union, United States, and Japan together consistently absorbed some 80 percent of these worldwide exports. In terms of world exports, as Figure 3 shows, the share of developing countries hovered around 60 percent. Europe's share was about 15 percent in recent years and that of Japan and the United States was almost negligible. An important factor behind the sustained growth of shrimp supply is aquaculture. According to Haby, et. al (2002) , it increases esp. in the 1980s, starting from 5 percent of world production in 1980 to an impressive 30 percent at the end of the decade. In the 1990s growth tapered off and aquaculture's share stabilized around 35 percent. Developing and emerging economies in general, and the countries that I study in particular, play a prominent role in shrimp farming and more broadly in aquaculture as such.
Shrimp farming requires waterfront property that in many developed countries has higher value in other uses. In addition, developing countries have a low-wage workforce, and they are also less restricted by environmental laws. Water pollution and the destruction of mangrove areas are sometimes linked to shrimp culture. Note finally that a country's shrimp output fluctuates significantly over time. Shrimp farming is risky. The crop is largely determined by weather and ecological conditions on the one hand.
On the other hand, shrimp culture is also quite vulnerable to diseases that can severely reduce crops, as
for China in 1993 , Thailand in 1996 and 1997 , and Ecuador in 1999 In sum, the shrimp market has been a very important export market for developing countries since the 1980s. Shrimp production is often a more lucrative alternative to rice. 
II. Stylized Facts.
Thailand, as the world's premier exporter of shrimp, plays a key role in our analysis. The different panels of Figure 4 characterize Thai monthly exports to the United States and Europe between January 1996 and July 2004 and also those of our five other countries.
The first panel plots the gross tariff rate for Thai shrimp, 1 + the ad valorem tariff rate.
Throughout the period Thailand did not face any import tariffs for its shrimp in the United States-Our time period ended as the preliminary anti-dumping tariffs were announced by the Commerce Department.
In the European market, on the other hand, one clearly sees a stepwise increase in the tariff from 4.5 percent before the revision of Thailand's GSP status in 1997 to 9 percent and finally to 12 percent for frozen shrimp at the beginning of 1999 when Thailand gained full MFN status. Throughout I consider the market of frozen and cooked shrimps and prawns that have been the least processed. 
The significant coefficient estimates in the first column of Table I 
(2) I allow for country effects and include a separate dummy for India in 1998, when exports to Europe were temporarily banned. Since mostly China and Vietnam were severely affected by the antibiotics crisis, I include an additional antibiotics dummy, Antibiotics YZ, for both. The Thai tariff is also part of the regression-since other countries' tariffs did not change, they are part of the country effect. Here again, adding other variables in the context of the model will not alter sign, or significance.
The regressions confirm the initial results for Thailand. The tariff shifted the markets and so did the antibiotics crisis. Since the Thai share increased faster than that of the other countries in the wake of the tariff increase and the antibiotics crisis, we obtain a negative coefficient on tariff and a negative coefficient on Antibiotics. The estimates suggest that the impact of the antibiotics crisis was even more dramatic in China and Vietnam. Adding the coefficient on the antibiotics dummy to the interaction with China and Vietnam gives a net positive effect. Since Thailand had already reallocated a significant part of its market after it lost its GSP status, this is not surprising. Also, the India dummy has the expected sign.
It temporarily shifts Indian shrimp away from Europe to the United States. Table I a third column with a panel version of regression (1) for the five other countries together -not relative to Thailand. As before, the impact of the antibiotics crisis varies between China and Vietnam on the one hand and Ecuador, India, and Indonesia on the other hand. I include the dummy for India in 1998 and the Thai tariff. This regression is telling for its insignificant coefficients. In spite of the reallocation between the United States and the European Union, the E.U. tariff hike on Thailand is a major factor for all other countries. Similarly, the antibiotics crisis is not statistically significant for Ecuador, Indonesia, and India. Strategic interactions in the shrimp market may play a role.
I include in
The regression suggests that the massive reallocation of Thai, Chinese, and Vietnamese exports from Europe to the United States after the tariff hike or the antibiotics crisis, is not matched by a comparable reallocation of exports in the other direction by unaffected countries. This important observation will help rationalize the focus of the model. In particular, I will concentrate on the exporter's own decision of how to allocate her exports between two markets, rather than on any strategic interactions.
In the third panel, the bold line displays the changing dollar price [unit value] for 1 kilogram of Thai shrimp in the United States versus in Europe. A few observations are worth making. If the law of one price held, the ratio of the dollar price of Thai shrimp in the United States versus the dollar price in Europe should be one throughout. If the law of one price held in differences, one should observe a constant for the entire period. Clearly, this is not the case, which makes studying price differences between both markets a meaningful exercise. In light of the extensive pass-through literature, this is not much of a surprise and illustrates the localized nature of international markets. [For comparison, I also include the ratio of the dollar price in the United States versus the euro price in Europe to show that not all the action is coming from the exchange rate.] As for the pattern of the dollar price ratio for Thai shrimp, the relative price clearly moves downward after 2001 and after the tariff reduction. The remaining panels plot for the other countries the relative price together with the changing share of their shrimp exports to the United States in the total U.S. and European exports. 21 One can discern a pronounced downward movement of the relative dollar price for the Chinese and the Vietnamese shrimp. For Ecuador and Indonesia, no such pattern can easily be discerned. There is a bit of an upward price move for India.
III. Model.
In this section, I present a simple model to guide the empirics and to formalize the key idea that the above stylized facts suggest. The model motivates the controls that are needed in order to assess more rigorously the impact of tariff and non-tariff barriers on the price of shrimp. I focus on the decision of individual exporters to allocate exports between the European and U.S. market. This focus is motivated by the stylized facts above. In a first step, I assume there are multiple exporters from different countries. While an exporter may in reality strategically reallocate some of his exports in response to what happens to other competitors, I assume and the described facts suggest that the exporter primarily responds to the restrictions in his own export market.
I assume that the demand for shrimp varieties and their substitutes, c, is determined at each moment in time by a CES utility function in the two destination markets, j, Europe and the United States.
I suppress the time subscripts.
where σ is the elasticity of substitution and typically larger than 1.
Optimization yields the familiar demand for good i in country j, c ij .
21 The plots of the relative prices show a similar pattern when deflated by U.S. or E.U. consumer price index. I consider shrimp a product that is differentiated by country of origin. In other words, I assume that there is complete international specialization in production. Therefore, c ij coincides with the total import demand for shrimp from country i. Since I am primarily interested in explaining shrimp prices and how these prices evolve over time, I rewrite Equation (4) as follows.
Equation (5) is an inverse demand function that states how much consumers are willing to pay for shrimp.
[I assume that p i has a negligible impact on the aggregate price index.] Since I later argue that tariff changes only imply supply shifts, it is important to emphasize that the willingness to pay is expressed in terms of the actual price consumers pay. Therefore, there is no shift in demand (willingness to pay) when a tariff is imposed, as long as Y j s and P j S are not affected, which I assume. Note that prices are expressed in local currency since these are the relevant ones for consumers-consumers are no international arbitrageurs. To express euro prices in dollars, one simply multiplies the left and right side with the eurodollar exchange rate.
I am especially interested in how the price of shrimp compares in the United States versus
Europe. Equation (6) gives the equation that is the basis for my estimates and that is derived from Equation (5). Following Chang and Winters (2002) , I focus on real prices. Note that comparing shrimp prices in local currency as in Equation (6) is identical to comparing their dollar prices-the exchange rate that is needed to convert euro prices in dollars on the left side will cancel since it is also needed to convert the right side into dollars.
Equation (6) states that the relative consumption of the United States and Europe matters in these localized markets for how the relative shrimp price changes between those markets. Common movements underlying shrimp prices for country 1 and 2 are differenced out. Moreover, as the analysis of relative supply x i1 /x i2 that in equilibrium equals relative consumption c i1 /c i2 will make clear, the localized prices are explicitly linked through the exporter's allocation decision, so that changes in one market affect the price in the other market. Let's now specify the supply side of the model.
In agricultural economics inverse demand systems that take the quantity as given are fairly common, especially in studies of local fish markets with high frequency data. An oft-cited study is Barten and Bettendorf (1989) . The motivation for this assumption is straightforward. Fish landings are fairly unpredictable as they are, to a large extent, determined by ecological circumstances and the weather.
Moreover, since fish is perishable food, it has to be sold, so the amount that is caught determines the price.
23 While this logic is widely accepted, in an international context, there is an additional level of complexity. Even when the total harvest is in the short run exogenous, foreign suppliers still have to decide how much of their catch or harvest they send to one particular market. Consequently, how much shrimp exporters decide to export to the U.S. versus the E.U. market does not only depend on the total harvest. It also depends on a comparison of both markets.
Since the interconnectedness of international markets is key to the analysis and since I work with high-frequency data, I explicitly consider an exporter's short-term decision to allocate a given shrimp catch or harvest between two markets, which will be the United States and Europe. 24 I assume that in order to maximize profits the exporter varies the export quantity between markets. In doing so, she can affect the price in the different export markets. The exporter takes as given the tariffs and considers the price net of tariffs, the exchange rate, the marginal costs, and the behavior of the other suppliers. The exporter i maximizes the following profit function. I suppress the i subscripts for the different exporters.
s.t.
where E j refers to the exchange rate between country 1 or 2 and the exporter's home currency, x j, refers to the quantity of the good exported to country j, is derived from Equation (5) and is the price that the exporter receives: the price net of tariffs that is a function of e.a., x j p j ; α j captures the marginal cost of exporting to both markets, which among other things will be a function of bilateral distance.
I assume that the exporter maximizes profits in his domestic currency. She translates the foreign goods prices into her own currency with the dollar and euro exchange rate. I assume that markets are localized, that is, producers can charge a different price in different markets. I allow for different marginal costs α of delivering shrimp to one market versus to another. Needless to say that differentα's could ij p 23 Shrimp harvests in aquaculture (like trawling) are very dependent on ecological and meteorological circumstances. Note also that in the context of developing countries, storage technology, resources, and information to adjust production in response to prices tend to be less prevalent. 24 Considering multiple markets is consistent with the pricing to market literature, see Goldberg and Knetter (1997) . Different, of course, is the given X, the focus on inverse demand curves and trade restrictions.
capture differences in transportation costs. 26 I assume that the exporter knows the conditions in her export markets, i.e. she knows relationships (5). She thus understands how quantities affect prices in both export markets and takes this into consideration as she decides on how much to send where. Moreover, the exporter's maximization is subject to the constraint that the exports to the United States and Europe add up to the exogenous quantity of the catch or harvest, X. Consequently, any amount that the exporter sends to the United States does not go to Europe and the reverse. In this way, in spite of the exporter's ability to charge a different price in different markets, the prices in Europe and the United States are closely linked.
The exporter depresses the price in one localized market the more she exports to it, she props up the price in the other market where she exports less. The exporter's decision on how much to export to either market is a function of the characteristics of both markets, the exchange rates, and the marginal delivery costs. In this way, changes in the conditions of one market will affect the export supply to the other market.
where τ i1 and τ i2 refer to the tariffs in markets 1 and 2.
There is an important difference between my setup and that of Chang and Winters (2002), and Feenstra (1989) . These authors consider a pricing decision (with market-specific marginal costs) that isolates markets from each other. I also allow for different prices across countries, yet I explicitly connect the different markets through the exporter's allocation decision (of a given harvest). Because of this decision, circumstances in Europe, such as the antibiotics crisis will affect the amount of shrimp sent to the United except for 1996 where it was 4.5 percent. In the wake of European Union's revision of its GPS tariff system, Thailand has seen its initial 4.5 percent tariff increase. From 1997 onward, it faced a tariff of up to 9 percent in. By 1999, Thailand had graduated from the GSP system and the regular MFN tariff of 12 percent since then. In the analysis, I will focus on the tariff change in Thailand, since this is the only significant tariff variation there is in the data. The exchange rate is a monthly average. To construct the aggregate shrimp indices for Europe's and the
U.S.'s main exporters, I use the unit values from the aggregate exports to the United States and European
Union from their 11 most important exporters, respectively for HTS 030613 and 160520 combined ("ShrimpII") and HTS 030613 ("ShrimpI"). will allow for a separate antibiotics effect for on the one hand Ecuador, India, Indonesia and other hand the three countries mentioned before.
V. Specification and Results.
The question of interest is to determine how the price of shrimp is affected by the changing conditions in the export markets and especially where those relate to changes in trade policy. The main focus is on Thailand, the world's premier exporter of shrimp, and on China and Vietnam. I include Indonesia, India, and Ecuador, to make sure that my findings for Thailand, China, or Vietnam are not reflective of the shrimp market as such.
Using the relative demand Equation (6), it is fairly straightforward to obtain regression (9) for the real relative shrimp price in the United States versus Europe, with three dummies for the four seasons as additional controls (spring is the benchmark). Note that the regressors in (9) (9). In addition, however, the exporter's decision is based on other factors that do not affect the consumer willingness to pay. These factors-the antibiotics crisis and the retraction of Thailand's preferential tariff-are then potential instruments to help trace out demand as they shift the supply curve while demand stays put.
Note that the exporter, not the consumer, is the one who compares multiple markets to decide on where to send his output. Any change in the relative cost factors may make him shift his export markets.
From the specifics of the shrimp market we know that the antibiotics crisis and the loss of the GSP status were significant factors in the decision of exporters to send their goods to either the United States or to
Europe. In the case of Thailand, for example, the zero-tolerance policy in Europe at the height of the crisis meant that its shrimp shipment would be tested, which would cost delays of a few weeks. It also gave way to uncertainty as to whether antibiotics would be found in the shipment, which raised the possibility that the shrimp would be destroyed. [Developing countries do not have the very sensitive machines that Europe uses to enforce its testing policy. Only by the end of the crisis will they import test kits mainly from the Netherlands.] The antibiotics crisis is a good instrument, since it primarily affects the producer who will reduce the exports to Europe and increase those to the United States. 33 The antibiotics crisis barely registers in the media in Europe and the United States, where it could affect consumer behavior. The actual anti-dumping case will attract much more attention. 34 In theory, the dollar-euro exchange rate is a candidate instrument. However, as an aggregate variable, it affects income and thus demand, whereas my instruments are specific to the shrimp market and identified with a shifting supply. Table III presents the estimates of regression (9) for Vietnam and China. I correct the error in all cases for AR (1) autorcorrelation since the Durbin Watson is about 1 or smaller, suggesting positive autocorrelation. I report the instrumental variable (IV) estimates that are very similar to the non-IV estimates. For each country separately, I present four different estimates. As indicated by the theory P S is a reference aggregate price index for shrimp or substitutes-I use P S to deflate the nominal shrimp prices.
One can argue about how broadly this price index should be defined. I therefore estimate regression (9) with four different price indexes. The estimates are reported in Table III from left to right in decreasing order of the generality of the price index. The first column uses the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the second the Food Price Index (Food). In the third column, I take the unit value of shrimp (prepared and less prepared, HTS 160520 and 030613) for all major trading partners ("Shrimp I") and the fourth column the unit value of only the less prepared shrimp (HTS 030613) for these countries ("Shrimp II").
35
As one can see, the coefficient on relative consumption for China and Vietnam is significant in most instances at the 99 percent level, except for with the shrimp price index for China that is significant at 90 percent. The estimated coefficient has the expected sign: a higher willingness to consume in one market versus another requires a lower relative price. The coefficient on relative consumption is fairly robust and does not vary much across the different estimates. Moreover, the coefficient is also very similar across countries. The coefficient on relative income is positive for both countries; for Vietnam it is always significant and larger than 1. The seasonal dummies do not matter for Vietnam, yet they are significant for China in the fall (3) and sometimes in the winter (4) when prices tend to be somewhat higher. As one can see, there is a significant amount of autocorrelation with the rho coefficient between 0.5 and 0.7. Overall the R 2 varies between 0.2 and 0.1 for Vietnam and China.
For both countries, I estimate a coefficient on relative consumption that is relatively small in size, on average in the order of -0.11 or -0.085 for Vietnam and China. In other words, relatively large shifts in consumption between the United States and Europe are needed to affect relative prices in a tangible way. Holding all else constant, an increase in relative consumption of about 9 percent or 11 percent is needed to decrease the shrimp price with 1 percent. The demand for shrimp seems to be fairly elastic (σ is on average between 9 and 11).
We are, of course, interested in whether these estimates have anything to say about the impact of the antibiotics crisis on the relative prices. To get a sense of the magnitude of the impact, one can look at the magnitude of the coefficient on the antibiotics dummy in the first-stage regression that relates the exported quantities to the tariffs and to the other variables in the model. The first-stage regression approximates the exporter's decision as defined by equation (8) and thus shows how exporters redirect their exports away from Europe toward the United States in response to Europe's high food-safety 35 The 11 countries include our 6 countries plus Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, the Philippines, and Malaysia.
standards. [I report the first-stage regression that STATA uses in order to obtain two-stage estimates in Table VI .] The coefficient of the Antibiotics dummy in column (a) of Vietnam's and China's block has the expected positive sign. The coefficient is significant at the 99 percent level. To gauge the impact of the antibiotics crisis, I multiply the average coefficient of relative consumption with 2.58 and 3.05, respectively the coefficient on antibiotics for Vietnam and China. The antibiotics crisis may thus, on average, have had a negative impact in the order of 0.29 percent on the real relative prices for Vietnam and 0.26 percent for China. All in all, in light of the fairly drastic shifts in trade patterns this is a fairly small number, even while taking into consideration the fact that the dummy is only a fairly crude proxy for the antibiotics crisis since it does not vary with its intensity.
Let's now turn to Thailand whose estimates are reported in Table IV . The coefficient on relative consumption is negative and with on average -0.115 in the same order of magnitude as that for China and
Vietnam. There is again a significant amount of autocorrelation and the R 2 is slightly higher. It ranges between 0.15 and 0.3. Comparing the estimates of the first-stage regression from Table VI column (a) and the average coefficient of relative consumption, we can again infer the impact of the antibiotics crisis. The coefficient on the antibiotics dummy is with 2.03 smaller for Thailand than it is for China and Vietnam. This is not so surprising. From the panels of Figure I we remember that the share of Thailand's exports to Europe had already shrunk after it lost its preferential status and traded under a regular MFN tariff.
Overall, the antibiotics crisis decreased the relative price in the United States versus in Europe with about 0.23 percent, again, a fairly small amount. With a fairly elastic shrimp demand, more significant quantities would have been needed to make a bigger dent in the relative price.
Now consider, on the other hand, the relatively strong impact of the tariff reduction. The coefficient on the tariff in the first-stage regression is statistically significant at 99 percent and as expected negative. The coefficient is about eight times as large as the coefficient on the antibiotics dummy and shows indeed a very strong response in terms of the export volume leaving Europe for the United States.
Multiplied by the average consumption coefficient, the impact of a 1 percent tariff is in the order of a 1.85 percent drop in the relative price. As Europe retracted Thailand's preferential tariff, Thailand's gross tariff increased from 1.045 to 1.12, an increase of 7 percent. Holding all else equal, a similar tariff hike would cause a drop in the U.S. price relative to that of Europe of 12.85 percent. 36 This suggests indeed that with a relatively elastic demand especially tariffs have the most pronounced direct impact on relative prices.
One concern about running a regression such as (9) for only one country is that it may capture a change in the relative price that is common to shrimp markets for many exporting countries. 37 To address this issue, I compare in the panel regression (10) the difference between the Thai relative price (denoted with capital T) and the relative price for the other five countries (denoted by i) Vietnam, China, Ecuador, India, and Indonesia. Each time, I subtract Equation (6) for Thailand from one of the other countries.
Needless to say that P S for Europe and the United States drop out in this case, and so does the relative income term. shrimp exports relative to those in Thailand. The impact of the antibiotics crisis is again relatively small.
Again, there is a marked difference in how China and Vietnam are impacted by the antibiotics crisis (relative to Thailand) versus the other countries. Ecuador, India, and Indonesia see their relative price increase relative to Thailand in the wake of the antibiotics crisis, whereas Vietnam and China's decreases. 37 Using different measures for PP S already, in part, addresses this concern.
The results for China and Vietnam are also in line with the one-country regressions and confirm the earlier findings.
Conclusion
In a recent article, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) offer a framework that strikes a balance between the more traditional notions of an integrated market with one world price and the more recent emphasis on segmented markets. Prices of internationally traded goods can be localized, yet they still will depend on policy changes in other (large) countries as exporters compare market conditions globally when they decide where to export to.
As argued, the trade policy changes overseas and their impact in the United States set the stage for the anti-dumping case against six developing countries in the United States-the largest anti-dumping case since the steel tariffs. More generally, the shrimp case casts a light on North-South relations. It illustrates the leverage that developed countries have as the main consumers of (many of) the exports from developing countries on the price that these countries receive.
Finally, there is a last point that warrants mentioning in light of the increasing use of technical regulations as instruments of trade policy that Maskus and Wilson (2001) analyze and in light of the Doha round and its emphasis on increasing market access for developing countries. Even if the price effects of the export reallocations in response to safety restrictions are limited, the difference in standards and the sometimes lacking clarity about the exact nature of the standards is certainly disruptive, increases costs, and creates uncertainty for the exporters. The shrimp case raises issues that relate to the call for harmonizing food-safety standards and the call for more transparency of procedures. It also touches upon the need for a transfer of technology, so that developing countries themselves can determine whether their export products meet developed country standards, and also upon the call by some to include developing countries more fully in the process of setting standards. In this way, one can help prevent that SBS and TBT measures are used as ways to protect the interest of domestic industries or the interest of favored trading partners. Or, to paraphrase Baldwin (2000) , one can try to avoid a two-tier system of regulatory protection-with developing countries in the second tier. 
